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Abstract
We revisit the trading invariance hypothesis recently proposed by Kyle and Obizhaeva [1]
by empirically investigating a large dataset of bets, or metaorders, provided by ANcerno. The
hypothesis predicts that the quantity I := R/N3/2, where R is the exchanged risk (volatility ×
volume × price) and N is the number of bets, is invariant. We find that the 3/2 scaling between
R and N works well and is robust against changes of year, market capitalisation and economic
sector. However our analysis clearly shows that I is not invariant. We find a very high correlation
R2 > 0.8 between I and the total trading cost (spread and market impact) of the bet. We propose
new invariants defined as a ratio of I and costs and find a large decrease in variance. We show
that the small dispersion of the new invariants is mainly driven by (i) the scaling of the spread
with the volatility per transaction, (ii) the near invariance of the distribution of metaorder size
and of the volume and number fractions of bets across stocks.
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1 Introduction
Finding universal scaling laws between trading variables is highly valuable to make progress in our
understanding of financial markets and market microstructure. In the wake of these discoveries,
Kyle and Obizhaeva posit a trading invariance principle that must be valid for a bet, theoretically
defined as a sequence of orders with a fixed direction (buy or sell) belonging to a single trading
idea [1, 2]. This principle supports the existence of a universal invariant quantity I – expressed in
dollars, independent of the asset and constant over time – which represents the average cost of a
single bet. In particular, taking the share price P (in dollars per share), the square daily volatility
σ2d (in %
2 per day), the total daily amount traded with bets V (shares per day) and the average
volume of an individual bet Q (in shares) as relevant variables, dimensional analysis suggests a
relation of the form:
PQ
I
= f
(
σ2d
Q
V
)
, (1)
where f is a dimensionless function. Invoking the Modigliani-Miller capital structure irrelevance
principle yields f(x) ∼ x−1/2, which implies up to a numerical factor that:
I =
σdPQ
3/2
V 1/2
:=
R
N3/2
, (2)
where R := σdPV measures the total dollar amount of risk traded per day (also referred to as
total exchanged risk or trading activity) while N := V/Q represents the number of daily bets
for a given contract. Notwithstanding, the 3/2 law can be interpreted with different degrees of
universality as discussed in [3]: no universality (the 3/2 holds for some contracts only), weak
universality (the 3/2 holds but with a non-universal value of I) and strong universality (the 3/2
holds and I is constant across assets and time).1
Let us stress that identifying an elementary bet in the market is not a straightforward task.
Theoretically, a bet is defined as a trading idea typically executed in the market as many trades
over several days. As suggested by Kyle and Obizhaeva in their original work [1], metaorders,
i.e. a bundle of orders corresponding to a single trading decision typically traded incrementally
through a sequence of child orders, can be considered a proxy of these bets; in this work we will
make use of such an approximation and use the words ‘bet’ or ‘metaorder’ indifferently. Beyond
the subtleties in the bet’s definition, there has been in the past few years empirical evidence that
the scaling law discussed above matches patterns in financial data, at least approximately. The
3/2-law was empirically confirmed by Kyle and Obizhaeva using portfolio transition data related
to rebalancing decisions made by institutional investors and executed by brokers [1]. Andersen et
al. [4] reformulated suitably the trading invariance hypothesis at the single-trade level and showed
that the equivalent version of Eq. (2) in such a setting holds remarkably well using public trade-
by-trade data relative to the E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts. Benzaquen et al. [3] substantially
extended these empirical results showing that the 3/2-law holds very precisely across 12 futures
contracts and 300 single US stocks, and across a wide range of time scales. Recently, Pohl et al.
[5] provided additional empirical evidence that the intriguing 3/2-law holds on trades data from
the NASDAQ stock exchange.
Notwithstanding, empirical data at the single transaction scale – see in particular [3] – revealed
that while the 3/2 law is very robust, the invariant I is actually quite far from invariant, as it
varies from one asset to the other and across time, thus in favour of the weak universality degree.
Note that this is consistent with the idea that a universal invariant with dollar units would be
quite strange, given that the value of the dollar is itself time-dependent. Benzaquen et al. [3]
showed that a more suitable candidate for an invariant was actually the dimensionless I := I/C
where C denotes the spread trading costs.
Yet, single transactions are typically not the same as single bets. Large and medium sized
orders are typically split in multiple transactions and traded incrementally over long periods of
time. Empirically market data do not allow to infer the trading decision and to link different
1 Note that here we only explore the daily level, time does not mean the same thing as in [3] where we varied the
time intervals over which the variables were computed.
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transactions to a single execution.2 In order to test the trading invariance hypothesis at the bet
level and its relation with trading costs, it is necessary to have a dataset of market-wide (i.e. not
from a single institution) metaorders.
This is precisely the aim of the present paper, which leverages on a heterogeneous dataset of
metaorders extracted from the ANcerno database.3 To our knowledge such a thorough analysis
at the bet level for a wide range of assets is still lacking.
Our main finding is that, while the 3/2-law works surprisingly well, the quantity I is not
invariant, as pointed out in [3]. We show that this quantity is strongly correlated with transaction
costs, including spread and impact. Therefore we introduce new invariants, obtained by dividing
I by the cost and we show that these quantities fluctuate very little across stocks and time
periods. Finally we show that the observed small dispersion of the new invariants can be connected
with three microstructural properties: (i) the linear relation between spread and volatility per
transaction; (ii) the near invariance of the metaorder size distribution, and (iii) of the total
volume and number fractions of the bets across different stocks.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the dataset collecting trading
decisions of institutional investors operating in the US equity market. In section 3 we show that
the 3/2-law holds surprisingly well at the daily level independently of the time period, of the
market capitalisation and of the economic sector. In section 4 we compute the invariant I and we
argue in favour of weak universality. We propose a more natural definition for a trading invariant
that accounts both for the spread and the market impact costs; and we exhibit the microstructural
origin of its small dispersion. Some conclusions and open questions are presented in section 5.
2 Data
Our analysis relies on a database made available by ANcerno, a leading transaction-cost analysis
provider (www.ancerno.com). Our dataset counts heterogeneous institutional investors placing
large buy or sell orders executed by a broker as a succession of smaller orders belonging to the
same trading decision of a single investor. Our sample includes the period January 2007 – June
2010 for a total of 880 trading days. Only metaorders completed within at most a single trading
day are held. Further, we select stocks belonging to the Russell 3000 index, thereby retaining ∼ 8
million metaorders distributed quite uniformly in time and representing ∼ 5% of the total reported
market volume, regardless of market capitalisation (large, mid and small) and economical sectors
(basic materials, communications, consumer cyclical and non-cyclical, energy, financial, industrial,
technology and utilities). More details and statistics on the investigated sample are presented in
Appendix A.
3 The 3/2-law
Here we investigate the trading invariance hypothesis at the daily level. The daily timescale choice
avoids an elaborate analysis of when precisely each metaorder starts and ends, thereby averaging
out all the non-trivial problems related to the daily simultaneous metaorders executed on the
same asset [6].
3.1 Exchanged risk
From the metaorders executed on the same stock during the same day we compute the total
exchanged volume in dollars:
∑N
i=1 pivi, where N is the number of daily metaorders per asset in
the ANcerno database, vi and pi are respectively the number of shares and the volume weighted
2In fact, for example, Kyle and Obizhaeva tackled this problem investigating a proprietary dataset of portfolio
transitions.
3ANcerno Ltd. (formerly the Abel Noser Corporation) is a widely recognised consulting firm that works with
institutional investors to monitor their equity trading costs. Its clients include many pension funds and asset managers.
In [1] the authors claim that the ANcerno database includes more orders than the data set of portfolio transitions
they used in their work. From a preliminary research Albert S. Kyle and Kingsley Fong found that proxies for bets in
ANcerno data have size patterns consistent with the proposed invariance hypothesis discussed in [1, 2].
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Figure 1: Plots of the mean daily exchanged risk 〈R〉N as function of the daily number N of
metaorders per asset conditional to the market capitalisation (top left panel), the economic sec-
tor (top right panel), and the time period (bottom left panel). The insets show the slopes obtained
from linear regression of the data, firstly averaged respect to N and secondly log-transformed. The
bottom right panel shows a plot of 〈R〉N as function of N for a subset of 200 stocks chosen randomly
from the pool of around three thousand US stocks: the two insets represent respectively the distri-
bution of the slopes and of the y-intercept, i.e. 〈I〉 := 〈R〉N/N3/2, obtained from linear regression
of the data, firstly averaged respect to N and secondly log-transformed of the data considering each
stock separately.
average price (vwap) of the i-th available metaorder. We then define the total daily exchanged
ANcerno risk per asset as:
R :=
N∑
i=1
Ri , with Ri = σdvipi , (3)
and where σd denotes the daily volatility per asset, computed as σd = (phigh − plow)/popen from
the high, low, and open daily prices only.4 The statistical properties of the bets, in terms of their
associated risk Ri and of their total daily number N per asset are discussed in Appendix A. The
variability of the observables over several orders of magnitude should allow to test the 3/2-law
quite convincingly.
4We checked that the results discussed in the present work are still valid using other definitions of the daily volatility
and of the price in analogy to what done for example in [1]. Specifically, the results are still valid when computing σd
with the Rogers-Satchell volatility estimator [3, 7] or as the monthly averaged daily volatility, i.e. σ¯d =
∑25
m=1 σd,m
and/or defining the price pi as the closing price of the day before the metaorder’s execution.
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3.2 Empirical evidence
We introduce the mean daily exchanged risk 〈R〉N , where in general 〈•〉N := E[•|N ] denotes in a
compact way the average over various days and stocks with a fixed daily number of metaorders
N . As shown in the first three panels of Fig. 1 the scaling 〈R〉N ∼ N3/2 holds well independently
of the conditioning to market capitalisation, economic sector, and time period. Slight deviations
may have different origins but can mostly be attributed to the heterogeneous sample’s composition
in terms of stocks for each bucket in N . The 3/2-law is also valid for individual stocks, as shown
in the bottom right panel of Fig. 1. The bottom left inset shows that the slopes are clustered
around the 3/2-value. However, the y-intercepts of the fitted lines for individual stocks vary
substantially (see the bottom right inset in the bottom right panel of Fig. 1), which indicates that
I is not constant across different stocks. More empirical insights on the origin of the 3/2 law are
presented in Appendix B.
4 The trading invariant
The conjecture that the quantity 〈I〉 := 〈R〉N/N3/2 is invariant across different contracts is
clearly rejected by the empirical analysis performed in the previous section. Indeed, the quantity
〈I〉 varies by at least one order of magnitude across different stocks. This result goes against
the strong universality version of the trading invariance hypothesis which states that both the
average value 〈I〉 and the full probability distribution of I = R/N3/2 should be invariant across
products. Dimensionally I is a cost (i.e. it is measured in dollars) and indeed the trading invariance
hypothesis posits that the cost of a bet is invariant. Using the identification of metaorders and bets
we can use the ANcerno dataset to estimate the trading cost, including a spread and a market
impact component. We will show that I and trading cost are very correlated, and therefore
propose new invariants based on their ratio.
4.1 Trading costs and trading invariants
Trading costs are typically divided into fees/commissions, spread, and market impact. For large
orders, like those investigated here, fees/commissions typically account for a very small fraction
and therefore we will neglect them. We shall however take into consideration both the spread cost
(as was done at the single-trade level in [3]) and the market impact cost computed from the square
root law (see e.g. [6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]). We thus define the average daily bet ’s trading cost
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Figure 2: (Left) Empirical distributions of the KO invariant I = RN−3/2, of the daily average bet ’s
total trading cost C (using Yspd = 3.5 and Yimp = 1.5 in Eq. 4), and of the dimensionless invariant
I := I/C. (Right) Empirical distributions in log-log scale of the KO invariant I rescaled respectively
by the total daily average cost C, by the spread cost Cspd and by the market impact cost Cimp.
5
as:
C = Cspd+Cimp = Yspd× 1
N
N∑
i=1
Svi+Yimp× 1
N
N∑
i=1
σdvipi
√
vi
Vd
:= Yspd×C0spd+Yimp×C0imp , (4)
with S the average daily spread,5 Vd the total daily market volume, Yspd and Yimp two constants
to be determined. The factor Yspd depends, among other things, on the fraction of trades of
the metaorder executed with market orders, whereas Yimp only weakly depends on the execution
algorithm and is typically estimated to be very close to unity [6, 8, 15]. The empirical properties
of C0spd and C0imp and the relative importance of the two terms as a function of the metaorder size
are presented in Appendix C. To determine Yspd and Yimp we perform an ordinary least square
regression of the KO invariant I with respect to the daily average cost C defined for each asset
by Eq. 4. We obtain Yspd ' 3.5, Yimp ' 1.5 and a coefficient of determination R2 ' 0.8. These
results show that the original KO invariant is indeed strongly correlated with the trading cost.
Since these costs have no a priori reason to be universal, this explains why I is not invariant.
Guided by such results and by the fact that a market microstructure invariant, if any, should
be dimensionless, we define new invariants by dividing the original KO invariant I by the cost of
trading. Therefore, we consider three different specifications, namely:
I = IC , Ispd =
I
Cspd , Iimp =
I
Cimp . (5)
The left panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution of the original KO invariant I together with
that of I, and of the cost C. It is visually quite clear that rescaling by the cost dramatically
reduces the dispersion, and that the distribution of I is very similar to that of C, with some
deviation for small value. The right panel compares the distribution of I with that of the other
two new invariants. A quantitative comparison is provided in Table 1, which reports the mean,
the standard deviation, and the coefficient of variation6 (CV) of I and of the three new invariants.
It is clear that, due to the correlation between I and C, the new invariants I◦ (with ◦ = spd, imp)
have a much smaller CV than I. Since the distributions have clear fat tails, we also implemented
a robust version of CV obtained by replacing the standard deviation with the mean absolute
deviation (MAD), here denoted CVMAD. The table indicates that also in this case the new
invariants are much more peaked than I. Notice also that with CVMAD the three new invariants
become similar, while with CV the invariant Iimp is more dispersed.
Table 1: Statistics of the different invariants, namely the original KO invariant I (left), and the three
new ones rescaled by cost (right). MAD is the mean absolute deviation and CV stands for coefficient
of variation.
I · 103 ($) I Ispd Iimp
mean 6.33 2.20 4.70 7.8
st. dev. 11 1.84 3.11 12.2
MAD 6.9 1.25 2.21 7.56
CV 1.74 0.84 0.66 1.56
CVMAD 1.09 0.57 0.47 0.97
4.2 Origin of the small dispersion of the new invariants
Here we investigate the origin of the small dispersion of the new invariants. Let us first consider
only the impact cost normalisation only and rewrite Iimp as:
Iimp = N
∑N
i=1 σdpivi
YimpN3/2(σd
∑N
i=1 pivi
√
vi/Vd)
. (6)
5The daily spread is recovered from a dataset provided by CFM since it is not available in the ANcerno dataset.
6The coefficient of variation is the ratio of standard deviation and mean, an indicator of distribution ‘peakedness’.
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Figure 3: Empirical distributions of the ratio m = [v3/2]/[v]3/2 (left panel), η = V/Vd (central panel)
and ξ = N/Nd (right pannel), all three computed at the daily level for each asset: we randomly
group the stocks in equally sized samples and for each of them we compute the empirical distribution
respectively of m, η and ξ finding that they are, to a first approximation, stock independent.
Using pi ' p, for all the metaorders executed in a day on a stock, the above expression simplifies
to:
Iimp = 1
Yimp
√
η
[v]3/2
[v 3/2]
=
1
Yimpm
√
η
, (7)
where η := V/Vd with V :=
∑N
i=1 vi is the total ANcerno bet volume, [•] is a daily average
operation per stock, and m > 1 is the normalized 3/2th moment of v (number of shares of a
bet), which depends on the shape of the distribution of metaorder size. We have checked that m
as well as η are, to a first approximation, independent of the stock (see left and central panels
in Fig. 3) indicating that the distribution of metaorder size is, to a large degree, universal and
that the ANcerno database is representative of the trading across all stocks. These observations
explains why Iimp is also, to a large degree, stock independent.
For the total cost normalisation, our understanding of the invariance property relies on the
following empirical fact. The average spread is proportional to the volatility per trade, that is
S = cpσd/
√
Nd, where c is a stock independent numerical constant, see [15, 16]. Indeed, the above
arguments taken together show that the dimensionless quantity I can be written as:
I = 1
Yspdc
√
ξ + Yimpm
√
η
, (8)
where ξ := N/Nd is found to be stock independent (see right panel in Fig. 3). Therefore I is also
stock independent. However, the fact that the CV of I is less than both those of Ispd and Iimp
suggests that the Kyle-Obizhaeva “invariant” reflects the fact that metaorders are commensurate
to the total cost of trading, including both the spread cost and the impact cost.
5 Conclusions
In this work we empirically investigated the market microstructure invariance hypothesis recently
proposed by Kyle and Obizhaeva [1, 2]. Their conjecture is that the expected dollar cost of
executing a bet is constant across assets and time. The ANcerno dataset provides a unique
laboratory to test this intriguing hypothesis through its available metaorders which can be treated
as a proxy for bets, i.e. a decision to buy or sell a quantity of institutional size generated by a
specific trading idea. Let us summarise what we have achieved in this paper:
• Using bets issued for around three thousand stocks, we showed that, at the daily timescale
interval, the N3/2 scaling law between exchanged risk R and number of bets is observed
independently of the year, the economic sector and the market capitalisation.
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• The trading invariant I := R/N3/2 proposed by Kyle and Obizhaeva is non-universal: both
its average value 〈I〉 and its whole distribution clearly depend on the considered stocks, in
favour of a weak universality interpretation. Furthermore, this quantity has dollar units
which makes its hypothesised invariance rather implausible.
• On the basis of dimensional and empirical arguments, we propose a dimensionless invariant
defined as a ratio of I and of the bet’s total cost, which includes both spread and market
impact costs. We find a variance reduction of more than 50%, qualitatively traceable to
the proportionality between spread and volatility per trade, and the near invariance of the
distributions of bet size, of the volume fraction and number fraction of bets across stocks.
Our empirical analysis has allowed to show that the trading invariance hypothesis holds at the
bet level in a strong sense provided one considers the exchanged risk and the total trading cost
of the bets. This is in the spirit of Kyle and Obizhaeva’s arguments, but takes into account the
fact that transaction costs are both asset and epoch dependent. As anticipated in [3], our results
strongly suggest that trading “invariance” is a consequence of the endogeneisation of costs in the
trading decision of market participants, and has little to do with the Modigliani-Miller theorem.
It would actually be quite interesting to investigate other markets such as bond markets, currency
markets or futures markets, for which the Modigliani-Miller theorem is totally irrelevant, while
trading invariance still holds – at least at the level of single trades [3, 4]. Finally, differences in
market structure across countries, such as execution mechanisms, fees and regulations could also
challenge the validity of the results presented here.
Acknowledgments
We thank Alexios Beveratos, Laurent Erreca, Antoine Fosset, Charles-Albert Lehalle and Amine
Raboun for fruitful discussions. This research was conducted within the Econophysics & Complex
Systems Research Chair, under the aegis of the Fondation du Risque, the Fondation de l’Ecole
polytechnique, the Ecole polytechnique and Capital Fund Management.
Data availability statement
The data were purchased from the company ANcerno Ltd (formerly the Abel Noser Corporation)
which is a widely recognised consulting firm that works with institutional investors to monitor
their equity trading costs. Its clients include many pension funds and asset managers. The authors
do not have permission to redistribute them, even in aggregate form. Requests for this commercial
dataset can be addressed directly to the data vendor. See www.ancerno.com for details.
8
References
[1] Albert S. Kyle and Anna A. Obizhaeva. Market microstructure invariance: Empirical hy-
potheses. Econometrica, 84(4):1345–1404, 2016.
[2] Albert S. Kyle and Anna A. Obizhaeva. Dimensional analysis, leverage neutrality, and market
microstructure invariance. 2017.
[3] Michael Benzaquen, Jonathan Donier, and Jean-Philippe Bouchaud. Unravelling the trading
invariance hypothesis. Market Microstructure and Liquidity, 2(03n04):1650009, 2016.
[4] Torben G. Andersen, Oleg Bondarenko, Albert S. Kyle, and Anna A. Obizhaeva. Intraday
trading invariance in the e-mini s&p 500 futures market. 2016.
[5] Mathias Pohl, Alexander Ristig, Walter Schachermayer, and Ludovic Tangpi. Theoretical
and empirical analysis of trading activity. arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.04892, 2018.
[6] Elia Zarinelli, Michele Treccani, J. Doyne Farmer, and Fabrizio Lillo. Beyond the square
root: Evidence for logarithmic dependence of market impact on size and participation rate.
Market Microstructure and Liquidity, 1(02):1550004, 2015.
[7] L. Christopher G. Rogers and Stephen E. Satchell. Estimating variance from high, low and
closing prices. The Annals of Applied Probability, pages 504–512, 1991.
[8] Bence To´th, Yves Lemperiere, Cyril Deremble, Joachim De Lataillade, Julien Kockelkoren,
and Jean-Philippe Bouchaud. Anomalous price impact and the critical nature of liquidity in
financial markets. Physical Review X, 1(2):021006, 2011.
[9] Nicolo G. Torre and Mark J. Ferrari. The market impact model. Horizons, The Barra
Newsletter, 165, 1998.
[10] Robert Almgren, Chee Thum, Emmanuel Hauptmann, and Hong Li. Direct estimation of
equity market impact. Risk, 18(7):5862, 2005.
[11] Robert Engle, Robert Ferstenberg, and Jeffrey Russell. Measuring and modeling execution
cost and risk. Chicago GSB Research Paper, no. 08-09, 2006.
[12] Xavier Brokmann, Emmanuel Serie, Julien Kockelkoren, and Jean-Philippe Bouchaud. Slow
decay of impact in equity markets. Market Microstructure and Liquidity, 1(02):1550007, 2015.
[13] Fre´de´ric Bucci, Iacopo Mastromatteo, Zolta´n Eisler, Fabrizio Lillo, Jean-Philippe Bouchaud,
and Charles-Albert Lehalle. Co-impact: Crowding effects in institutional trading activity.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.09565, 2018.
[14] Fre´de´ric Bucci, Michael Benzaquen, Fabrizio Lillo, and Jean-Philippe Bouchaud. Crossover
from linear to square-root market impact. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.05230, 2018.
[15] Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Julius Bonart, Jonathan Donier, and Martin Gould. Trades, quotes
and prices: financial markets under the microscope. Cambridge University Press, 2018.
[16] Matthieu Wyart, Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Julien Kockelkoren, Marc Potters, and Michele
Vettorazzo. Relation between bid–ask spread, impact and volatility in order-driven markets.
Quantitative Finance, 8(1):41–57, 2008.
[17] Charles M. Jones, Gautam Kaul, and Marc L. Lipson. Transactions, volume, and volatility.
The Review of Financial Studies, 7(4):631–651, 1994.
9
A Statistics of metaorder sample
Here we describe some statistics of the metaorders executed from the main investments funds and
brokerage firms gathered by ANcerno. The empirical probability distribution of the number of
metaorders N per asset, of the risk Ri exchanged by a metaorder and of the total daily traded
risk R per asset are illustrated in Figure 4. It emerges that both the number of daily metaorders
N and the risk measures typically vary over several orders of magnitude. In particular, as evident
from the left panel in Fig. 4, there is a significant number of metaorders active every day, since in
average ∼5 metaorders are executed per day for each asset. Furthermore, as shown in the right
panel of Fig. 4, both the single bet’s risk Ri and the total daily exchanged risk R vary over
almost eight decades. Note that these statistical properties are approximately independent from
the time period and from the economical sector of the asset exchanged through metaorders.
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Figure 4: (Left panel) Empirical probability distribution of the daily number N of metaorders per
asset: N is broadly distributed over two decades with an average close to 5. (Right panel) Empirical
probability distributions of the exchanged risk per metaorder, i.e Ri := σdvipi, and of the total daily
risk per day/assets, i.e R := ∑Ni=1Ri.
B The 3/2-law under the microscope
One may rightfully wonder whether it is possible to understand the 3/2-law from the statistical
properties of the metaorders. To this purpose we start by investigating the individual metaorder’s
risk Ri distribution properties as a function of N . We find that when rescaling the metaorder’s
risk Ri by the square root of the number N of daily metaorders per asset one obtains a conditional
cumulative distribution P(Ri/
√
N |N) dependent on N but with a mean E[Ri/
√
N |N ] invariant
on N (see Fig. 5). It emerges then that the conditional average metaorder risk Ri can be predicted
from the number N of daily metaorders per asset since E[Ri|N ] scales as Nγ with γ ' 0.5, that
is E[Ri|N ] ∼
√
N .7 It immediately follows that combining this empirical result and the linearity
property of the mean, one recovers the 3/2-law E[R|N ] ∼ N3/2, since:
E[R|N ] = E
[ N∑
i=1
Ri
∣∣∣N] = N∑
i=1
E[Ri|N ] = N E[Ri|N ] ∼ N
√
N = N3/2. (9)
To explain the scaling E[Ri|N ] ∼
√
N through the product E[σd|N ]×E[vipi|N ] we need to check
for the correlation between the daily volatility σd and the volume in dollars vipi of a metaorder,
7In analogy, the variance V[Ri|N ] scales linearly with N , i.e. V[Ri|N ] ≈ E[Ri|N ]2.
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Figure 5: Empirical cumulative distribution of the traded metaorder’s risk Ri = σdvipi without (left
panel) and with (right panel) rescaling by the square root of the daily number N of metaorders per
asset. The colored vertical lines represent the location of the average for each sample conditional on
N . To note that also if the empirical distribution is not an invariant function of N , we observe that
E[Ri/
√
N |N ] ' const., as evident from the vertical lines in the right panel, which is at the origin of
the measured 3/2-law.
which is found to be 〈C(σd, vipi)〉 ≈ 3 × 10−2. For each stock we regress Ri ∼ Nγ , σd ∼ Nν ,
vipi ∼ Nδ, and we obtain from the empirical distributions of the exponents in Fig. 6 that their
average values read 〈γ〉 = 0.5, 〈ν〉 = 0.25 and 〈δ〉 = 0.20, thus 〈γ〉 6= 〈ν〉 + 〈δ〉. However, by
looking at the scatter plot of the estimated exponent γ as function of the sum ν + δ computed
separately for each stock (see bottom right panel in Fig. 6) one observes a clear linear relation.
A possible and intuitive explanation of the non null measured correlation between σd and vipi
is that metaorders add up to volume, generate market impact and thus increase price volatility.
In this way trading volume increases due to both an increase in the number of bets and in their
sizes, and so does volatility from the increased market impact as discussed for example in [17].
Note that this reasoning is valid even if the metaorders only account for a certain percentage
of the total daily market volume V =
∑N
i=1 vi = ηVd with η adjusting for the partial view of
the ANcerno sample in terms of volume, and for the non-bet traded by intermediaries: from our
dataset we measure in average 〈η〉 ≈ 5× 10−2.
C Statistics of trading costs
As expected, we find that, for a single bet with unsigned volume v, the spread cost cspd = S × v
is dominant for small volumes, while the market impact cost cimp = σd × vp×
√
v/Vd takes over
for large volumes (see left panel of Fig. 7). Furthermore, as shown in the right panel of Fig. 7, the
average daily market impact cost Cimp accounts on average for ≈ 1/2 of the total daily trading
average cost C = Cspd + Cimp, computed using Y0 = 3.5 and Y = 1.5 in Eq. (4).
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Figure 6: (Top left panel) Empirical distribution of the scaling exponent ν computed for each stock
regressing σd ∼ Nν : in average 〈ν〉 = 0.25 as shown by the dashed black line. (Top right panel)
Empirical distribution of the scaling exponent δ computed for each stock regressing vipi ∼ N δ: in
average 〈δ〉 = 0.20 as shown by the dashed black line. (Bottom left panel) Empirical distribution of
the scaling exponent γ computed for each stock regressing Ri ∼ Nγ : in average 〈γ〉 = 0.5 as shown
by the dashed black line. (Bottom right panel) Signature scatter plot (coloured by density of data)
of the coefficients ν + δ and γ respectively estimated conditioning to each stock.
12
10−5 10−3 10−1
v/Vd
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
E[
··
·|v
/V
d
]
cspd/c
cimp/c
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
x
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
p(
x
)
Cspd/C
〈Cspd/C〉
Cimp/C
〈Cimp/C〉
Figure 7: (Left panel) Averaged spread and market impact cost ratios given respectively by cspd/c
and cimp/c - with cspd = S × v (spread cost), cimp = σd × vp ×
√
v/Vd (market impact cost) and
c = cspd + cimp (total cost per bet) - as function of the metaorder’s order size v/Vd: to note that for a
bet with small (large) order size the spread (market impact) cost is dominant. (Right panel) Empirical
distributions of the Cspd/C and Cimp/C ratios which give us an idea of the order of magnitude of the
different contributions to the total daily average cost per bet C = Cspd + Cimp (computed from Eq. 4
fixing Yspd = 3.5 and Yimp=1.5): the dashed vertical lines represent the location of the mean values
equal respectively to 〈Cspd/C〉 = 0.49 and 〈Cimp/C〉 = 0.51.
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